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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to
play’’—on the level of attorneys’ fees in securities class actions. We find that state
pension funds generally pay lower attorneys’ fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity. This
differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to
officials with influence over state pension funds. Thus, pay to play appears to increase
agency costs borne by shareholders in securities class actions.
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1.

Introduction
One of the main goals of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was

to “empower investors so that they, not their lawyers, control securities litigation.” 1
Congress believed that individual investors who served as class representatives prior to
the enactment of the PSLRA were largely figureheads dominated by class action lawyers.
Because the interests of class action lawyers were typically much greater than those of
the named class representatives, plaintiffs may have lacked the incentive to monitor
class counsel adequately. To remedy that imbalance, the PSLRA creates a presumption
that courts will appoint as lead plaintiff the class member seeking appointment with the
largest financial interest in the relief sought. 2 Large shareholders, the theory went,
would have more of an incentive to oversee lawyers who represent the class. Congress
hoped that institutional shareholders serving as lead plaintiffs would better negotiate
with class counsel over attorneys’ fees, ensuring that a larger share of the recovery
would accrue to the class members.
In some ways, it appears that the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision has succeeded.
After a slow beginning, institutional investors have stepped forward in large numbers to
serve as lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA has changed the game for class action lawyers, who
must now compete for the favor of institutional investors in order to be selected as
counsel. There is evidence that this competition has played an important role in
reducing the percentage of the class recovery that goes to paying the lawyers post‐
PSLRA.
1
2

S. REP. NO. 104‐98 (1995). See also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104‐369, at 32 (1995).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D.
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There have been rumors, however, of another form of competition to garner the
favor of institutional lead plaintiffs. Most of the institutional investors that have agreed
to serve as lead plaintiffs have been government‐sponsored pension funds. Many of
these funds are managed directly by politicians, such as state comptrollers, who must
campaign to retain their current positions, or may have designs on higher offices.
Alternatively, these funds are managed by political appointees, who typically owe their
position to the state’s governor. The presence of political influence over these funds
naturally raises the question of whether law firms are making political contributions to
the politicians who wield that influence in order to enhance their chances of being
selected to represent the pension funds. Simply put, are law firms buying lead counsel
status with campaign contributions, i.e., do class action lawyers pay to play? And do
campaign contributions have any effect on the level of attorneys’ fees paid in securities
class actions? In other words, what is the price paid by class members if lawyers are
paying to play?
This paper presents the results of an empirical study shedding light on that
question. Looking at a sample of securities class actions filed between 2003 and mid‐
2007, we find that the presence of a state pension fund as lead plaintiff correlates with
significantly lower attorneys’ fees. That effect is confined, however, to state pension
funds whose management has not received campaign contributions. Attorneys’ fees in
cases with state pension funds whose managers have received campaign contributions
are statistically indistinguishable from attorneys’ fees in cases with individual investors
serving as lead plaintiffs.

Thus, political contributions to lead plaintiffs appear to
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undermine at least one of the objectives that Congress had in enacting the PSLRA’s lead
plaintiff provision.
We proceed as follows.

Part 2 provides background on the lead plaintiff

provision and develops hypotheses relating to political influence on pension funds
serving as lead plaintiffs. Part 3 describes our sample and sources of data. Part 4
presents the results of our empirical tests of our hypotheses. Part 5 concludes with a
discussion of the legal and policy implications of our findings.

2.

Background and Hypotheses
2.1

Prior Literature

One of the abuses of securities class actions that Congress attempted to address
in enacting the PSLRA was “the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom
they purportedly represent.” 3 Congress found a potential solution to that problem in a
proposal by Weiss and Beckerman (1995).

Weiss and Beckerman argued that

institutional investors, if placed in the lead plaintiff role, would act as effective monitors
of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ actions in securities class action litigation. Congress acted on
Weiss and Beckerman’s proposal in adopting the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision. That
provision established a “rebuttable presumption . . . that the most adequate plaintiff . . .
is the person or group of persons that . . . has the largest financial interest in the relief
sought by the class.” 4 The PSLRA also stated that the most adequate plaintiff will

3
4

See H.R. Rep. No. 369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1103.
15 U.S.C. § 78u‐4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).

3
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“select and retain counsel to represent the class.” 5 The premise of the PSLRA’s lead
plaintiff provision is that larger investors, with larger stakes in the class recovery, will
serve as more effective monitors of class counsel. By providing effective monitoring,
the lead plaintiff will protect the interests of the absent class members.
Congress worried, however, about the potential for lead plaintiff monitoring to
be undermined by side payments, which were rumored to have been an issue in
securities class actions prior to the adoption of the PSLRA. The concern was that
plaintiffs were being paid by lawyers for agreeing to serve as the class representative,
and those payments undermined the class representative’s incentive to look out for the
interests of absent class members.

To address the problem of side payments

undermining monitoring, Congress included a provision in the PSLRA prohibiting non
pro‐rata payments to the lead plaintiff. 6 Congress’s suspicion of possible side payments
to individual lead plaintiffs appears to have been well‐founded; several former partners
of the Milberg Weiss law firm (now “Milberg”) have gone to prison for hiding such
payments from courts overseeing securities class actions (Selvin 2008).
Those side payments appear to have had an effect on monitoring by lead
plaintiffs. One measure of lead plaintiff monitoring is attorneys’ fees; vigilant monitors
presumably would negotiate for lower fees, which would mean a greater net recovery
to class members. Consistent with this theory, Perino (2008) finds that attorneys’ fees
were significantly higher for Milberg Weiss cases identified in the indictment against the
firm where side payments to the lead plaintiffs were present than for those cases not
5
6

15 U.S.C. § 78u‐4(a)(3)(B)(v).
15 U.S.C. § 78u‐4(a)(4).

4
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identified in the indictment.
There is considerable evidence that the lead plaintiff provision has led to
improved monitoring of class counsel. Choi, Fisch and Pritchard (2005) report that
public pension funds’ participation as lead plaintiff increased significantly after the
PSLRA’s enactment.

They also report that the presence of public pension funds

correlates with high value settlements. Simmons and Ryan (2005) and Cox and Thomas
(2006) also report that institutional lead plaintiffs correlate with increased settlement
amounts. Cox, Thomas, and Bai (2008) similarly report that institutional investor lead
plaintiffs, in particular public pension funds and labor unions, are positively related to
larger settlement amounts. These studies suggest that institutional investors who serve
as lead plaintiffs may be promoting larger recoveries for shareholder class members.
Choi, Fisch and Pritchard (2005) examine the relationship of lead plaintiffs and
attorney fees. They report that attorney fees, measured as a percentage of recovery, if
anything, are higher with private institutional lead plaintiffs after the enactment of the
PSLRA compared with the pre‐PSLRA period; they also report no significant correlation
exists between fees and public pension funds post‐enactment once they control for the
size of the case. Their study looked only at cases filed from 1991 to 2000, so it
antedates the time that institutional investors stepped forward in large numbers to
serve as lead plaintiff. Perino (2006), looking at a larger sample of cases from 1995 to
2004, reports that attorney fees granted by a court are lower with public pension fund
lead plaintiffs, even after controlling for the presence of accounting restatements and
SEC investigations.
5
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There has been anecdotal evidence for some time of political contributions to
the lead plaintiff being linked to the plaintiff’s lead counsel selection, but little
systematic analysis.

For example, Fortune magazine ran a story detailing political

contributions received by former New York State Comptroller Carl McCall from the
partners at Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman (BLBG) (Weinberg & Fisher, 2004).
McCall received these contributions shortly before McCall chose BLBG to serve as the
New York public pension fund’s counsel in the WorldCom securities class action. McCall
was also involved in perhaps the most frequently cited example of pay to play in
securities cases, In re Cendant Corp. Litigation. The district court in Cendant discovered
that two law firms selected as lead counsel contributed nearly $200,000 to McCall’s
campaign, who was the sole director of the New York public pension fund that was a
lead plaintiff in the case (Dewan 2002). The district court in Cendant, however, refused
to find that pay to play took place, and this finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. 7
Johnson‐Skinner (2009) provides the first systematic effort to document pay to
play.

He presents summary statistics of law firm political contributions side‐by‐side

with pension funds’ selection of law firms as counsel in securities class actions from
2002 to 2006. He concludes, preliminarily, that there is substantial evidence of a
connection between political contributions and selection as lead counsel. He does not,
however, analyze the connection between contributions and attorneys’ fees. This study
fills that gap.

7

In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 269 (3d Cir. 2002).

6
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2.2

Hypotheses

As discussed above, Congress believed that individual investors who served as
lead plaintiffs were ineffective monitors and plaintiffs with larger stakes in the class
recovery were likely to negotiate harder with class counsel over fees. The PSLRA’s lead
plaintiff provision encourages institutional investors to step forward to serve as lead
plaintiffs. These institutional investors are quite varied in their size and sophistication.
State level public pension funds—e.g., Calpers—are typically the largest and most
sophisticated investors among those who have volunteered to serve as lead plaintiff.
Smaller institutions, however, like local government and labor union pension funds,
have also come forward to serve as lead plaintiffs. Finally, individuals continue to serve
as lead plaintiffs in a substantial percentage of cases.
We postulate a continuum of investor types when it comes to negotiating over
fees, with larger institutions, such as state pension funds, being the most effective in
negotiating for lower fees, because they have the greatest leverage in being able to
offer lawyers additional opportunities to serve as lead counsel in subsequent cases.
Other institutions, such as local government pension funds and labor unions, may have
greater stakes at issue than do individual investors, but they may lack the legal
sophistication of the large state pension funds. We postulate that individuals will
exercise the least influence in negotiating over attorneys’ fees.

Hypothesis 1: State public pension funds will negotiate the lowest attorney
fees, local government pension funds and labor unions will negotiate
intermediate fees, and individual lead plaintiffs will negotiate the highest.
7
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As noted above, the governing premise of the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision is
that investors with a larger stake in the class recovery will serve as better monitors of
the class’s interests. This incentive for better monitoring, however, may be undermined
if the decisionmakers for the institutional lead plaintiff have been receiving a selective
benefit—e.g., campaign contributions—not shared by other class members. Congress
worried about the effect of selective benefits when it adopted the prohibition against
non‐pro rata payments to class members discussed above.
We use attorneys’ fees as our measure of lead plaintiff monitoring.

We

hypothesize that political contributions to state pensions acting as the lead plaintiff—we
call such plaintiffs “conflicted”—may lead to diminished monitoring and correspondingly
higher attorneys’ fees.

Moreover, we postulate that attorneys’ fees are likely to

correlate with the size of the contributions to the state pension funds—the greater the
contribution, the greater the fee. In other words, size matters.

Hypothesis 2: Attorneys’ fees negotiated by conflicted state pension fund lead
plaintiffs will be no different than attorneys’ fees negotiated by individual
plaintiffs.
Hypothesis 2A: Attorneys’ fees will correlate with the size of the political
contributions made to the state pension fund lead plaintiffs.

Hypothesis 2A postulates that the magnitude of contributions is one measure of
the conflict created by political contributions. Another measure of that conflict is the
pervasiveness of those contributions. Are the decisionmakers of the state pension fund
frequent, or only occasional, recipients of contributions from securities class action
8
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attorneys?

Frequent recipients of political contributions may be signaling their

tolerance of higher fees.

Accordingly, we postulate that state pension fund lead

plaintiffs who receive contributions from class counsel associated with a higher
percentage of their cases are likely to agree to pay higher fees generally relative to
those state pension funds that receive fewer contributions.

Hypothesis 3: Attorneys’ fees will be higher in cases in which the state pension
fund lead plaintiffs are frequent recipients of political contributions from
securities class actions attorneys.

An additional area that we wanted to explore in this study is the role of local
government pension funds, which have increasingly become involved as lead plaintiffs
in securities class actions. Unfortunately, we were unable to locate data on political
contributions for most of the decisionmakers for the local pension funds in our dataset.
In the course of our investigation, however, we noted that most of the local pension
funds in our sample were represented by one of two law firms (“Pension Counsel”). 8
These firms appear to specialize in counseling local governments on pension and
employment law issues. They also have appeared as co‐counsel to one or more of the
specialist securities class action firms in a handful of securities class actions, although
this appears to be a sideline to their main legal work.
We surmise that these firms are steering their local pension fund clients to
become involved as lead plaintiffs, but the effect of their influence on attorneys’ fees in
securities class actions is unclear. One hypothesis would be that these firms are

8

The two firms are Klausner & Kaufman and VanOberbeke Michaud & Timmoney.

9
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receiving referral fees from traditional class action firms for delivering their clients to
serve as lead plaintiffs. That hypothesis would suggest that attorneys’ fees should be
higher in cases involving local government pension funds because the lead counsel firm
would want to be compensated for the referral fee. The competing hypothesis would
be that these firms are providing oversight of securities class action counsel on behalf of
their clients. That oversight might include negotiating on behalf of the class for lower
attorneys’ fees.

Given these plausible competing hypotheses, we do not have a

predicted direction for the effect of the involvement of these two firms on attorneys’
fees.

Hypothesis 4: Local government pension funds acting as lead plaintiff and
represented by pension counsel will negotiate for higher/lower attorneys’ fees.

3.

Sample and Descriptive Statistics

3.1

Sample
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of settlements for securities class

actions filed from 2003 to mid‐2007. 9 We obtain the suits from the Stanford Securities
Clearinghouse. We exclude cases in which financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) are the
primary defendant because of the different regulatory regime that applies to them.
[Insert Table 1 About Here].
Table 1 shows that the lawsuit filings were distributed relatively equally across
our sample period, although there is some tapering off in 2006 and 2007, as many of the
suits filed in those years remain unresolved. Looking at the frequency of lawsuit by
9

The sample is based on the dataset in Choi (2009).

10
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circuit, we find that the Second and Ninth Circuits are clearly head‐and‐shoulders above
their peers with 19.2% and 25.5% of the lawsuits.

3.2

Control Variables
Descriptive statistics regarding the cases are presented in Table 2. We use the

following set of variables in each of our multivariate models as controls (collectively
referred as “Case Controls”). The controls are relevant to the strength of the case,
which is likely to determine the difficulty of extracting a settlement. More difficult cases
may generate higher attorneys’ fees. We collect information on key aspects of the
litigation from the last amended complaint available for each class action. 10
From the complaints, we collect information about the causes of action alleged
and use indicator variables for the cause of action. Over 95 percent of the cases alleged
a Rule 10b‐5 claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 19.3 percent of the cases
alleged a § 11 claim under the Securities Act of 1933 (Section 11); 3.7 percent of the
cases alleged a § 14(a) claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 11 is
available only for material misstatements and certain omissions in the registration
statement used in a public offering, but it allows for a substantially greater chance of
surviving the motion to dismiss because § 11 does not require plaintiffs to plead
fraudulent intent. Unlike the Rule 10b‐5 cause of action, loss causation and due
diligence are affirmative defenses, rather than elements of the claim. Claims under § 14

10

As described in Choi (2009), the complaints and other securities‐docket‐related documents were
collected from the PACER website.

11
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of the Exchange Act relating to misstatements in a proxy statement also carry an easier
standard for state of mind and loss causation (Section 14).
[Insert Table 2 About Here].
We also include as controls certain indicator variables based on the allegations in
the complaint. These allegations are intended to satisfy the pleading standards, which
are the principal barriers to recovery in securities class actions. We include in our Case
Controls variables for SEC and other government investigations (Govt. Investigation) and
accounting restatements (Restatement), each a high profile adverse event and the most
common events triggering these suits. The presence of a government investigation or a
restatement indicates a higher likelihood of wrongdoing and thus a stronger case for the
plaintiffs.

The overall strength of the case will also be bolstered if the firm has

terminated a top officer, including the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer,
and Chief Financial Officer (Officer Term.) or its auditor (Auditor Term.), due to events
relating to the fraud in question as described in the complaints. We also include
whether the complaint alleges insider trading (Insider Trading Claim), which is relevant
to fraudulent intent.
We also include variables in our Case Controls relating to the firm‐specific
characteristics of the defendant issuer, which correlate with the damages measure and
the defendant’s ability to pay a settlement.

We include a measure of firm size,

measured as market value of equity measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding
the beginning of the class period (Market Capitalization). Larger firms may have greater
resources to defend against a class action. On the other hand, larger firms may also be
12
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

13

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 2 [2010]

Pay to Play
better able to pay a settlement, leading to more vigorous prosecution of the case by
plaintiffs’ attorneys.

We also include the share turnover during the class period

(Turnover) and the minimum one‐day stock return during the class period plus the day
after the end of the class period (Minimum Return) for the company at issue in the
complaint—both related to the potential damages available from the litigation. We also
include the settlement amount because prior studies report a close relationship
between settlement amount and the attorney fee award (e.g., Eisenberg & Miller,
2004).
We also include two industry controls that may relate to case strength and loss
causation. Firms in the high technology sector (High Tech) – defined as SIC codes – may
have stock prices that are particularly vulnerable to declines in sales or earnings. Firms
in pharmaceuticals and medical devices may experience steep stock price declines if the
Food and Drug Administration denies approval of their new products. To capture this
effect, we include an indicator variable (FDA) equal to 1 if the last amended complaint
for the class action contains allegations based on U.S. Food and Drug Administration‐
related disclosures and 0 otherwise. Finally, we include the log of the settlement
amount; all else equal, larger settlements are likely to correlate with lower percentage
fee requests.

3.3

Plaintiff Type
For each class action, we collect data from PACER, Westlaw, and the Securities

Class Action Clearinghouse on the federal district court docket and the motions for lead
13
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plaintiff.

Lead plaintiffs usually are combined in a lead plaintiff group of several

investors. Lead plaintiff groups typically are created to resolve disputes among class
action firms competing to be named as counsel to the class.
Table 3, Panel A provides descriptive statistics regarding the type of investors
selected as lead plaintiffs. Institutional investors appear as part of the lead plaintiff
group in over half (55.8%) of the cases in our sample, confirming earlier work showing
that institutional investors are important players securities class actions. Public pension
funds appear in nearly eighteen percent of the cases in our sample; with slightly fewer
state (8.3%) than local (9.1%) funds. State pension funds are the primary focus of our
analysis.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
Table 3, Panel B provides descriptive statistics comparing the assets under
management and losses related to the class actions for the different types of institutions
acting as lead plaintiff. As expected, the state pension funds are larger than their local
counterparts and labor union funds. The average (median) state pension fund in our
sample has nearly $15.0 billion ($6.1 billion) under management, while the local funds
manage an average of $8.1 billion ($0.4 billion). The difference between the two
means, however, is not significantly different from zero. State pension funds also had
larger securities losses related to the class action. The average (median) state pension
fund in our sample had $7.3 million ($1.8 million) losses in cases where they acted as
lead plaintiff while the local funds manage an average of $0.6 million ($0.3 million). The
difference between the two means is significant at the one percent level. Labor unions
14
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manage the least in assets, with an average of $1.1 billion ($0.6 billion). Labor unions
also had relatively low securities losses with an average of $0.8 million ($0.2 million).

3.4

Political Contributions
Having identified the lead plaintiffs in our sample, we collected data on

contributions to politicians connected to state pension funds. We first identified the
membership of the controlling boards of the plaintiff institutions at the time the case
was filed. For board positions that were ex officio, we determined who held the
relevant office at the time of filing of the complaint. For positions that were appointed
by an elected official, we also determined what elected official was in office at the time
of filing.
Next, we identified the plaintiff law firms that were selected as counsel by the
funds in each case in the sample. If there was more than one plaintiff law firm for a
given case, which was typically the case when more than one institution filed to be lead
plaintiff, all the filers and all the firms were grouped together. For purposes of matching
firms with plaintiff pension funds, we assumed that all funds and all counsel for a
particular case were affiliated.
We then used state‐level campaign finance filings to find instances of political
contributions from the identified law firms to any of the elected officials associated with
the pension funds that actually selected the firms. 11 Contributions from 1998 through
2008 were included in the search. The search allowed us to look for both contributions

11

The source of this data is followthemoney.org. Puerto Rico was treated as a state for these purposes.
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by the firm and by individuals who list the firm as their employer. Note that this
method is underinclusive as it does not discover any donors who did not indicate their
employer (for example, an attorney at Milberg Weiss who does not list Milberg Weiss as
her employer). We also searched for contributions to the relevant elected officials’
party committees in an attempt to find indirect contributions. 12
Our data are underinclusive in another way because we were unable to locate
systematic data for contributions to local, non‐state level politicians affiliated with
pension funds in our sample. We found press reports of such contributions in isolated
cases, and handful of large municipalities have websites showing such contributions, but
because we could not collect this data for all of the local government pension funds in
our sample, we have not relied on any contributions to local politicians in our analysis.
Thus, our findings are likely to understate the influence of pay to play, which appears to
also affect local pension funds.
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics showing the results of this research into
political contributions. Almost half (45.5%) of the state pension funds in our sample
received campaign contributions. For these firms, the mean contribution was relatively
small at $39,223 and the median contribution was $11,750. Aggregating all of the cases
in our sample, state pension funds received a mean of $52,170.

12

Note that we collect contribution data in part for a period of time after some of our securities class
actions are resolved. We nonetheless conjecture that such contributions correlate with the overall flow
of money to the specific state pension funds and thus reflect the influence of the plaintiffs’ attorneys
firms over the state pension funds in our sample.

16
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4.

Empirical Tests

4.1.

Multivariate Analysis of Political Contributions and Attorney Fees
We estimate an ordinary least squares model with the log odds of the requested

attorney fee percentage as the dependent variable (using case level data and robust
standard errors). Panel A of Table 5 reports that the mean requested attorney fee is
26.7% of the settlement amount. Our main independent variable of interest is the
fraction of the lead plaintiffs in a case that consist of a state pension fund (State
Pension). We also include the fraction of the lead plaintiffs that consist of a local
pension fund (Local Pension), or a labor union (Labor Union), and the fraction of lead
plaintiffs that are institutions but not government pension funds or labor unions (Other
Inst). The regression assesses the effect of these variables relative to our baseline
category of individual lead plaintiffs, the type of plaintiff that Congress found wanting
pre‐PSLRA.
In our regressions, we include an indicator variable Low Loss defined as equal to
1 if the losses for the lead plaintiffs for the case are at the median losses or lower for all
the lead plaintiffs in our sample or 0 otherwise. Plaintiffs with smaller losses at stake
may have less incentive to monitor class counsel. We include the Case Controls
described above. We also include indicator variables for those circuits with at least 20
class actions in the sample (Circuit Effects) and indicator variables for the resolution
year (Year Effects). 13

13

The Circuit Effects include indicator variables for the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 9th, and 11th circuits.
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ln(Atty_Feei/1‐Atty_Feei) = α + ß1iState Pensioni + ß2i Local Pension
+ ß3iLabor Union + ß4i Other Institution
+ ß5i Low Loss + Case Controls
+ Circuit Effects + Year Effects + εi

The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5, Model 1. Negative coefficients
for the independent variables correlate with lower attorneys’ fees, suggesting more
diligent monitoring by the lead plaintiff. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that
state pension fund lead plaintiffs request significantly lower attorneys’ fees, as do local
pension funds. Both coefficients are significant at the one percent level. Assessed at
the mean of all independent variables, a fifty percentage point increase in the fraction
of lead plaintiffs that consists of state pension funds correlates with a 2.8 percentage
point decrease in the attorney fee request (or 10.6% of the mean requested attorney
fees). Similarly, a fifty percentage point increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that
consists of local pension funds correlates with a 2.6 percentage point decrease in the
attorney fee request (or 9.8% of the mean requested attorney fees). The coefficients
for Labor Union and Other Institution are negative, but considerably smaller in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. Thus, these latter two categories of institutions
appear to be indistinguishable from individual plaintiffs when it comes to negotiating
attorneys’ fees with counsel.
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
To assess the impact of lead attorney contributions to political officials in control
of public pension funds, we replace the State Pension variable with two variables
(reported in Model 2): the fraction of lead plaintiffs in the case that consists of state
18
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pension funds with officials that received political contributions from the lead attorneys
(State Pension—Contribution), and the fraction of lead plaintiffs in the case that consists
of state pension funds with officials that did not receive political contributions from the
lead attorneys (State Pension—No Contribution).
The results of Model 2 suggest that the correlation between state pension funds
and lower attorneys’ fee observed in Model 1 is driven largely by state pension funds
that have not received campaign contributions. The coefficient for State Pension—
Contribution is negative, but insignificant, while the coefficient for State Pension—No
Contribution is negative and significant at the one percent level. Assessed at the mean
of all independent variables, a fifty percentage point increase in the fraction of lead
plaintiffs that consists of State Pension—No Contribution funds correlates with a 3.4
percentage point decrease in the attorney fee request (or 12.9% of the mean requested
attorney fees). These findings, consistent with Hypothesis 2, suggest that campaign
contributions seem to temper the zeal of state pension fund to squeeze lower fees out
of their attorneys.
To assess the importance of the amount of campaign contributions by attorneys,
we divide the State Pension—Contribution variable in Model 2 into two categories
(reported as Model 3). State Pension—Contribution Above Median is the fraction of
lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension funds which received a
contribution from the lead attorneys at the median or above for all state pension funds
that received contributions in our sample. Conversely, State Pension—Contribution
Below Median is the fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state public
19
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art2

20

Choi et al.:

Pay to Play
pensions with a contribution from the lead attorneys below the median for all state
pension funds that received contributions in our sample.
Consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 2A, the amount of the contributions
does seem to matter. For the cases in which the contributions are above the median,
the coefficient is actually positive, albeit insignificant. For the cases in which the
contributions were below the median, the coefficient is negative and strongly
significant. Assessed at the mean of all independent variables, a fifty percentage point
increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of State Pension—Contribution
Below Median funds correlates with a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the attorney fee
request (or 10.8% of the mean requested attorney fees). In fact, the coefficient for
State Pension—Contribution Below Median is statistically indistinguishable from the
coefficient for State Pension—No Contribution (F‐test probability is equal to 0.697). 14

14

We estimated a number of robustness tests for the models in Panel B of Table 5. First, we re‐estimated
the models without the inclusion of the Low Loss variable (due to possible colinearity between greater
losses and public pension funds). Unreported, the re‐estimated models resulted in the same qualitative
results as in Table 5.
Second, we re‐estimated Model 1 replacing State Pension, Local Pension, Labor Union, and Other
Institution with binary versions of each variable equal to 1 if the lead plaintiff group has at least one lead
plaintiff of the type in question (e.g. State Pension is redefined to equal 1 if at least one lead plaintiff is a
state pension fund) and 0 otherwise. For Model 2, we redefine State Pension—Contribution as equal to 1
if at least one lead plaintiff is a state pension fund and the state pension fund received political
contributions from the lead attorneys and 0 otherwise. We redefine State Pension—Contribution as
equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff is a state pension fund but the state pension fund did not receive
political contributions from the lead attorneys and 0 otherwise. For Model 3, we redefine State Pension—
Contribution Above Median as equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff is a state pension fund and the state
pension fund received a contribution from the lead attorneys at or above the median for all public
pension funds that received contributions in our sample. We redefine State Pension—Contribution Below
Median as equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff is a state pension fund and the state pension fund
received a contribution from the lead attorneys below the median for all public pension funds that
received contributions in our sample. For each of the re‐estimated model, we obtained the same
qualitative results as in Table 5 with the following exceptions. The coefficient on Local Pension is negative
but now significant at only the 5% level in Models 1 and 2 and the 10% level in Model 3.
Third, to control for selection effects, we re‐estimate the models of Table 5 with a Heckman two‐
stage model. Stage two is the models from Table 5. Stage one is a model for settlement. For an
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Only state pension funds that take in below the median level of contributions appear to
negotiate for lower attorney fees.

4.2.

Pension Fund Assets and Attorney Fees
Our next set of tests assesses the relation between assets under management

and attorneys’ fees. We postulate in Hypothesis 1 that larger pension funds will
negotiate for lower fees. To test this hypothesis, we estimate an ordinary least squares
model with the log odds of the requested attorney fee percentage as the dependent
variable (using case level data and robust standard errors). Our main independent
variables of interest are State Pension—Above Median Assets (the fraction of lead
plaintiffs in a case that consists of state public pensions with total fund assets at the

instrument, we use the total number of securities class actions filed in the dataset time period for the
district court in which the specific class action is filed (Heckman 1979). We assume this variable is
correlated with the decision to settle. A particular district court with large numbers of securities class
action may face greater pressure to dismiss such actions to clear their docket, leading to fewer
settlements. On the other hand, we assume this variable is not correlated directly with the number of
attorney hours worked in a particular settled litigation. Unreported, the Heckman models returned the
same qualitative results as in Table 5 with the following exceptions. The coefficient on Local Pension is
negative but now significant at only the 10% level in Models 1 through 3. The coefficient on State
Pension—Contribution Below Median in Model 3 is negative but now significant at only the 5% level.
Fourth, we examine the impact of contributions by plaintiffs’ attorney firms to any state official
for the state associated with a particular State Pension. It is possible that such donations may have an
indirect effect on public pension funds decisions. For example, donations to the Governor of a state may
lead the Governor to put pressure on the officials directly responsible for the public pension fund. We re‐
estimate Models 2 and 3 of Table 5 as follows. For Model 2, we replace State Pension—Contribution and
State Pension—No Contribution with State Pension—Contribution Any Official and State Pension—No
Contribution Any Official. Similar with Model 2of Table 5, the coefficient on State Pension—No
Contribution Any Official is negative and significant at the 1% level. Unlike in Model 2 of Table 5, State
Pension—Contribution Any Official is negative and now significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on
State Pension—Any Contribution is nonetheless smaller in magnitude than the coefficient on State
Pension—No Contribution Any Official. For Model 3, we replace State Pension—Contribution ≥ Median
with State Pension—Contribution Any Official ≥ Median (defined based on the median for all state
pensions in the sample that received a contribution for any official), State Pension—Contribution <
Median with State Pension—Contribution Any Official < Median, and State Pension—No Contribution with
State Pension—No Contribution Any Official. We obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 3 of
Table 5.
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median or above for state public pensions in our sample) and State Pension—Below
Median Assets (the fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state public
pensions with total fund assets below the median for state public pensions in our
sample). We also include two variables for Local Pension and Labor Union plaintiffs,
each divided by asset size in the same manner as the division for State Pensions
described above. We include a single Other Institution variable, as data on asset size is
not available for these institutions. These variables are in comparison to the base
category of individual lead plaintiffs. The other independent variables are the same as
those used in the regressions presented in Table 5.

ln(Atty_Feei/1‐Atty_Feei) =

α + ß1iState Pension—Above Median Assetsi
+ ß2iState Pension—Below Median Assetsi
+ ß3i Local Pension—Above Median Assetsi
+ ß4i Local Pension—Below Median Assetsi
+ ß5i Labor Union—Above Median Assetsi
+ ß6i Labor Union—Below Median Assetsi
+ ß5i Other Institution + ß6i Low Loss + Case Controls
+ Circuit Effects + Year Effects + εi

We report the results in Table 6, Model 1. The results are mixed. The coefficient
for Local Pension—Above Median Assets is negative and significant at the one percent
level. Assessed at the mean of all independent variables, a fifty percentage point
increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of Local Pension—Above Median
Assets funds correlates with a 4.2 percentage point decrease in the attorney fee request
(or 15.6% of the mean requested attorney fees). Thus, it appears that larger local
pension funds are more effective monitors than other types of investors who serve as
lead plaintiffs. Larger institutions may have economies of scale in supervising their
22
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attorneys or they may simply have greater bargaining leverage because of the
advantages they have in seeking lead plaintiff status. Larger holdings are likely to
correlate with larger losses, the relevant metric for awarding lead plaintiff status.
[Insert Table 6 About Here]
In Model 1, however, the coefficient on state pensions with below median assets
is negative and significant at the one percent level while the coefficient on state
pensions with above median assets, while negative, is not significantly different from
zero. Thus, unlike local pensions, state pensions with larger assets do not correlate with
lower attorney fees. We also find no distinction between labor unions with above and
below the median assets for labor union lead plaintiffs in our sample, possibly because
the variation in assets is less for labor unions. The standard deviation for fund assets is
$3.2 billion for labor unions, compared to $22.9 billion for public pension funds.
One explanation for the anomalous result with regard to state pension funds in
Model 1 might be campaign contributions. To assess whether attorney campaign
contributions affect the attorneys’ fees negotiated by larger state pension funds (and
the lack of correlation between large state pension funds and attorney fees), we divide
the State Pension—Above Median Assets variable in Model 1 into the following two
variables. State Pension—Above Median Assets Contribution is the fraction of lead
plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension funds that received a contribution from
one of the lead attorneys and that had total fund assets at the median or above for
state pension funds in our sample.

State Pension—Above Median Assets No

Contribution is the fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
23
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funds that did not receive a contribution from any of the lead attorneys and that had
total fund assets at the median or above for state pension funds in our sample.
We report the results as Model 2 in Table 6. Once we control for campaign
contributions, the results are generally consistent with Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for
State Pension—Above Median Assets No Contribution is negative and strongly
significant, and larger than the coefficient for State Pension—Below Median Assets. The
coefficient for State Pension—Above Median Assets Contribution, in contrast, is positive
and insignificant. Assessed at the mean of all independent variables, a fifty percentage
point increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of State Pension—Above
Median Assets No Contribution funds correlates with a 4.1 percentage point decrease in
the attorney fee request (or 15.2% of the mean requested attorney fees).

In

comparison, a fifty percentage point increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that
consists of State Pension—Below Median Assets funds correlates with a 2.7 percentage
point decrease in the attorney fee request (or 10.0% of the mean requested attorney
fees). Greater state public pension size does correlate with greater monitoring of
plaintiffs’ attorneys, but only if the state public pension officials have not received
contributions from the lead attorneys.

Larger public pension funds that receive

campaign contributions do not negotiate for lower fees relative to individual lead
plaintiffs. Moreover, they pay considerably higher fees than do pension funds that are
not the recipients of campaign contributions. 15

15

We estimated a number of robustness tests for the models in Table 6. First, we re‐estimated the
models without the inclusion of the Low Loss variable (due to possible colinearity between greater losses

24
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

25

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 2 [2010]

Pay to Play

4.3.

State Receptivity to Contributions
We postulated with Hypothesis 3 that the pervasiveness of the conflict created

by campaign contributions might influence attorneys’ fees. Table 7, Panel A shows the
state pension funds that received campaign contributions in the highest proportion of
cases were those in Colorado, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania, which all received
contributions from plaintiffs’ attorneys in each case in our sample where they appeared.
To assess the impact of the prevalence of conflict, we again estimate an ordinary
least squares model with the log odds of the requested attorney fee percentage as the
dependent variable (using case level data and robust standard errors). We define a
state pension fund as a having a frequent conflict if the state pension fund is associated
with a lead attorney that made a contribution to fund officials in more than seventy‐five
percent of the cases in our sample where the public pension fund acts as lead plaintiff.
For our main independent variables of interest we then define State Pension—Frequent
Conflict as the fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension funds
with a frequent conflict. We define State Pension—Infrequent Conflict as the fraction of
and public pension funds). Unreported, the re‐estimated models resulted in the same qualitative results
as in Table 6.
Second, we re‐estimated the models in Table 6 replacing State Pension, Local Pension, Labor
Union, and Other Institution with binary versions of each variable equal to 1 if the lead plaintiff group has
at least one lead plaintiff of the type in question and 0 otherwise. For each of the re‐estimated model, we
obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 6 with the following exception. The coefficient on Local
Pension—Above Median Assets is negative but now significant at only the 5% level in Model 3.
Third, to control for selection effects, we re‐estimate the models of Table 6 with a Heckman two‐
stage model. Stage two is the models from Table 6. Stage one is a model for settlement. For an
instrument, we use the total number of securities class actions filed in the dataset time period for the
district court in which the specific class action is filed (as discussed above in the robustness tests for Table
5). Unreported, the Heckman version of Model 1 returned the same qualitative results as in Table 6 with
the following exceptions. The coefficient on State Pension—Above Median Assets in Model 1 is negative
and now significant at the 5% level. The results in Model 2 remain qualitatively the same.
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lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension funds which do not receive
campaign contributions in more than seventy‐five percent of the cases in our sample for
which the pension fund acts as lead plaintiff. The other independent variables are the
same as those used in the regressions presented in Table 5.

ln(Atty_Feei/1‐Atty_Feei) = α + ß1iState Pension—Frequent Conflicti
+ ß2iStatePension—Infrequent Conflicti
+ ß3i Local Pension + ß4iLabor Union
+ ß5i Other Institution + ß6i Low Loss
+ Case Controls + Circuit Effects
+ Year Effects + εi

We present the results in Model 1 of Table 7, Panel B.

Consistent with

Hypothesis 3, we find that state pension funds that receive campaign contributions from
attorneys in a high proportion of their cases are quite generous with fees for those
attorneys. These funds negotiate attorneys’ fees that are significantly higher than the
fees negotiated by individual plaintiffs, while the funds with infrequent conflicts
negotiated significantly lower fees. Assessed at the mean of all independent variables, a
fifty percentage point increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of State
Pension—Frequent Conflict funds correlates with a 4.7 percentage point increase in the
attorney fee request (or 17.7% of the mean requested attorney fees). In contrast, a fifty
percentage point increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of State
Pension—Infrequent Conflict funds correlates with a 3.1 percentage point decrease in
the attorney fee request (or 11.7% of the mean requested attorney fees).
[Insert Table 7 About Here]
To assess further the overall receptivity of a fund to attorney political
26
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contributions, we replace the State Pension—Frequent Conflict and State Pension—
Infrequent Conflict variables with the following two variables.

We define State

Pension—Large Total Contribution as the fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists
of state public pensions with total contributions from any plaintiffs’ attorney firm above
$100,000, and State Pension—Small Total Contribution as the fraction of lead plaintiffs
in a case that consists of state public pensions with total contributions from any
plaintiffs’ attorney firm at $100,000 or below. The results are consistent with Model 1;
recipients of large contributions pay significantly higher attorneys’ fees than do
individual plaintiffs, while recipients of smaller contributions pay significantly less.
Assessed at the mean of all independent variables, a fifty percentage point increase in
the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of State Pension—Large Total Contribution
funds correlates with a 5.1 percentage point increase in the attorney fee request (or
19.1% of the mean requested attorney fees). In contrast, a fifty percentage point
increase in the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of State Pension—Small Total
Contribution funds correlates with a 3.2 percentage point decrease in the attorney fee
request (or 12.0% of the mean requested attorney fees). In sum, it appears that the
funds that receive the biggest campaign contributions are providing very little
monitoring, at least with respect to attorneys’ fees. 16

16

We estimated a number of robustness tests for the models in Panel B of Table 7. First, we re‐estimated
the models without the inclusion of the Low Loss variable (due to possible colinearity between greater
losses and public pension funds). Unreported, the re‐estimated models resulted in the same qualitative
results as in Table 7.
Second, we re‐estimated the models in Table 7 replacing State Pension, Local Pension, Labor
Union, and Other Institution with binary versions of each variable equal to 1 if the lead plaintiff group has
at least one lead plaintiff of the type in question and 0 otherwise. For each of the re‐estimated model, we
obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 7 with the following exceptions. The coefficient on
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4.4.

Pension Counsel
We examine the influence of pension counsel who appear to be steering their

local pension fund clients into appearing as lead plaintiff.

As noted above, we

discovered that two firms specializing in providing legal advice relating to pension
administration for local governments represented a substantial percentage of the local
government pension funds appearing as lead plaintiffs in our sample. Those firms have
also made occasional appearances as counsel in securities class actions, but always as
co‐counsel alongside traditional class action firms. We did not postulate a predicted
direction for their influence in Hypothesis 4.
We estimate an ordinary least squares model with the log odds of the requested
attorney fee percentage as the dependent variable (using case level data and robust
standard errors). For our main independent variables of interest, we use the same
independent variables as in Model 1 of Table 5 except that we replace Local Pension
with two variables: Pension Counsel and No Pension Counsel. We define Pension
Counsel as equal to the fraction of the lead plaintiff group that consists of local pensions
where at least one of the local pensions has a relationship with one of the two pension

State‐Pension—Frequent Conflict, while positive, is now not significant. The coefficients on Local Pension
are negative but now significant at only the 10% level in Models 1 and 2.
Third, to control for selection effects, we re‐estimate the models of Table 7 with a Heckman two‐
stage model. Stage two is the models from Table 7. Stage one is a model for settlement. For an
instrument, we use the total number of securities class actions filed in the dataset time period for the
district court in which the specific class action is filed (as discussed above in the robustness tests for Table
5). Unreported, the Heckman version of the models in Table 7 returned the same qualitative with the
following exceptions. The coefficient on State Pension—Large Total Contribution is positive but now
significant at only the 10% level.
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counsel firms. We define No Pension Counsel as equal to the fraction of the lead
plaintiff group that consists of local pensions without that relationship.

ln(Atty_Feei/1‐Atty_Feei) = α + ß1iState Pensioni + ß2iPension Counsel
+ ß2iNo Pension Counsel + ß3iLabor Union
+ ß4i Other Institution + ß5i Low Loss
+ Case Controls + Circuit Effects
+ Year Effects + εi

The results are presented in Table 8, Panel B. We find that lead plaintiffs
represented by the two pension counsel firms we identified appear to play the
monitoring role anticipated by Congress when it adopted the lead plaintiff provision.
The coefficient for Pension Counsel is negative and significant at the one percent level.
Assessed at the mean of all independent variables, a fifty percentage point increase in
the fraction of lead plaintiffs that consists of Pension Counsel funds correlates with a 3.0
percentage point decrease in the attorney fee request (or 11.4% of the mean requested
attorney fees). Thus, local pension funds represented by these firms appear to play the
same monitoring role as do the larger state pension funds. 17

17

We estimated a number of robustness tests for the model in Panel B of Table 8. First, we re‐estimated
the models without the inclusion of the Low Loss variable (due to possible colinearity between greater
losses and public pension funds). Unreported, the re‐estimated models resulted in the same qualitative
results as in Table 8.
Second, we re‐estimated the model in Table 8 replacing State Pension, Local Pension (as used in
the definition of Pension Counsel and No Pension Counsel), Labor Union, and Other Institution with binary
versions of each variable equal to 1 if the lead plaintiff group has at least one lead plaintiff of the type in
question and 0 otherwise. For each of the re‐estimated model, we obtained the same qualitative results
as in Table 8.
Third, to control for selection effects, we re‐estimate the model of Table 8 with a Heckman two‐
stage model. Stage two is the models from Table 8. Stage one is a model for settlement. For an
instrument, we use the total number of securities class actions filed in the dataset time period for the
district court in which the specific class action is filed (as discussed above in the robustness tests for Table
5). Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 8.
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[Insert Table 8 About Here]

4.5.

Case Quality
One question raised by the apparent agency cost problems that we have

identified with respect to campaign contributions is the effect that campaign
contributions might have on case selection. Are state pension funds induced to bring
frivolous suits by campaign contributions?
To assess this possibility, we estimate a logit regression with the same
independent variables as Table 5. Our binary dependent variable is coded as a 1 for
cases that produced a dismissal or settlement for nuisance value, which we define as
less than $3 million. This is a conservative estimate of defense costs, so we presume
that settlements for less than that amount had little merit.
[Insert Table 9 About Here]
The results are presented in Table 9. The only coefficient that is consistently
significant in the three models is Labor Union, which is negative and significant at the
five percent level. Thus, the presence of labor unions appears to correlate with suits of
greater merit. The coefficients for state pension funds are consistently insignificant,
whether or not we control for campaign contributions. We conclude that there is no
evidence that campaign contributions induce state pension funds to appear as lead
plaintiffs in cases of dubious merit. Rather, campaign contributions appear to be a tool
that plaintiffs’ lawyers use to gain advantage in the competition to be appointed class
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counsel in cases that attract multiple plaintiffs’ firms, which is likely to be the cases with
the most obvious evidence of fraud and the greatest potential damages. 18

5.

Conclusion
Congress adopted the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA because members of

Congress believed that individual investors were mere figurehead plaintiffs who did
little to monitor plaintiffs’ attorneys. Institutional investors, it was thought, would act
as more active monitors. The evidence to date suggests that institutional investors have
made a difference in bargaining for lower fees, which likely translates into greater net
recovery for investors. Those findings are confirmed here with respect to state pension
funds in general. We also find that local pension funds, while generally having smaller
stakes in class action recoveries, appear to also act as active monitors.
Congress worried, however, that the benefits of the lead plaintiff provision could
potentially be undermined by side payments from counsel to the lead plaintiffs. The
PSRLA prohibits lead plaintiffs from obtaining more than their pro rata share. The
political contributions received by state pension funds raise the question of whether
these funds are receiving selective benefits from the class action recovery in violation of
that provision.

18

We estimated a number of robustness tests for the models in Table 9. First, we re‐estimated the
models without the inclusion of the Low Loss variable (due to possible colinearity between greater losses
and public pension funds). Unreported, the re‐estimated models resulted in the same qualitative results
as in Table 9. The coefficient on Labor Union is negative and significant at the 1% level in all three models.
Second, we re‐estimated the models in Table 9 replacing State Pension, Local Pension, Labor
Union, and Other Institution with binary versions of each variable equal to 1 if the lead plaintiff group has
at least one lead plaintiff of the type in question and 0 otherwise. For each of the re‐estimated model, we
obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 9.

31
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art2

32

Choi et al.:

Pay to Play
Political contributions plainly have an impact. The evidence presented here
shows that the greater monitoring produced by the lead plaintiff provision in general for
state pension funds largely disappears when state pensions are the recipients of political
contributions. When it comes to negotiating for fees, state pension funds that take
political contributions are indistinguishable from the figurehead individual investors that
Congress was targeting with the PSRLA.
This result is hardly surprising, but it has potentially important implications.
Courts have generally been skeptical of allegations of pay to play in the selection of class
counsel, with some suggesting that the problem is more theoretical than real. We have
shown, however, that pay to play imposes a real cost on investors in class actions, who
end up paying greater attorneys’ fees. Courts may be justified in taking a closer look
when state pension funds that have received political contributions come forward to
seek lead plaintiff status. The evidence presented here suggests that such institutions
should not be presumed to be the vigorous monitors that Congress anticipated when it
adopted the PSLRA.
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Table 1: Sample Description
Full Sample
Outcome
Settlement
Settlement ≤ $3 M.
Settlement > $3 M.
Trial Verdict or Judgment
on Pleadings for Plaintiff
Dismissal
Total

Freq.
271
81
190

Percent
49.72
14.86
34.86

2

0.37

272
545

49.91
100.00

Freq.

Percent

2003

77

28.41

2004

87

32.1

2005

63

23.25

2006

38

14.02

2007

6
271

2.21
100.00

Freq.

Percent

17
52
28
10
23
9
8
10
69
17
27
1
271

6.27
19.19
10.33
3.69
8.49
3.32
2.95
3.69
25.46
6.27
9.96
0.37
100.00

Settlement Sample
Year of Filing

Total
Circuit Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
DC
Total
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Settled Class Actions
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Low Loss

271

0.358

0.480

Rule 10b‐5

269

0.955

0.207

Section 11

270

0.193

0.395

Section 14

271

0.037

0.189

Restatement

267

0.438

0.497

Govt. Investigation

271

0.273

0.446

Officer Termination

271

0.373

0.484

Auditor Termination

263

0.076

0.266

Insider Trading

266

0.549

0.499

Settlement Amount

268

20.963

84.399

Market Capitalization

261

3054.470

13097.150

Turnover

257

0.874

0.214

Minimum Return

258

‐0.280

0.147

High Tech

271

0.159

0.366

FDA
267
0.026
Variable definitions are in the appendix.

0.160
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Table 3: Lead Plaintiffs for Settled Class Actions
Panel A: Lead Plaintiff Types
Cases with at least One
Lead Plaintiff of the
Type

Percentage of
Cases

148

55.8%

46

17.4%

0.126

State

22

8.3%

0.064

Local

24

9.1%

0.062

14

5.3%

0.043

Labor Union

65

24.5%

0.186

Other Institution

62

23.4%

0.137

Cases

Percentage of
Cases

Individual Only

117

44.2%

Total Cases with Lead
Plaintiff Information

265

100.0%

Lead Plaintiff
Institution
Public Pension

Pension Counsel

Lead Plaintiff

Mean Fraction of
Lead Plaintiffs
Per Case

Panel B: Pension Fund Assets and Losses
N

Mean

p25

p50

11646.0

427.8

3666.4

10616.4

22900.2

35
3.5
0.2
0.6
Assets
22
14996.3 3507.1
6119.4
Losses
15
7.3
0.4
1.8
Local
Assets
21
8136.2
92.9
427.8
Losses
20
0.6
0.1
0.3
Labor Union
Assets
64
1147.0
271.1
572.4
Losses
49
0.8
0.1
0.2
Pension fund assets are in millions of dollars, measured as of 2005.

1.8
16522.3
3.7
3666.4
0.7
909.5
0.6

11.5
20392.3
17.1
25285.6
0.8
3188.5
2.2

Public Pension

Assets

43

Losses

State

p75

Std. Dev.
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Table 4: Campaign Contributions
Attorney Contribution to State Pension Fund Lead Plaintiffs
Cases

Percentage

Contribution

10

45.5%

No Contribution

12

54.6%

Mean Total
Contribution
‐ By Case
(Median)
39,223
(11,750)

Std.
Dev.

65,906

Mean Total
Contribution
‐ Aggregate
(Median)
52,170
(28,350)

Std.
Dev.

55,375
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Table 5: Campaign Contributions and Attorneys’ Fees
Panel A
Requested Fee

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

238

0.267

0.335

Panel B
State Pension

Model 1
‐0.303**
(‐3.50)

State Pension—Contribution

Model 2

Model 3

‐0.147
(‐0.92)

State Pension—Contribution ≥ Median

0.005
(0.02)

State Pension—Contribution < Median

‐0.313
(‐3.19)

**

State Pension—No Contribution

‐0.374**
(‐4.06)

‐0.363**
(‐3.95)

Local Pension

‐0.280**
(‐3.11)

‐0.276**
(‐3.05)

‐0.265**
(‐2.91)

Labor Union

‐0.076
(‐1.55)

‐0.071
(‐1.48)

‐0.063
(‐1.34)

Other Institution

‐0.024
(‐0.46)

‐0.024
(‐0.45)

‐0.020
(‐0.37)

Low Loss

0.064
(1.99)

*

0.071*
(2.16)

0.070*
(2.13)

‐0.743**
‐0.709**
‐0.747**
(‐5.54)
(‐5.75)
(‐5.78)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
217
216
216
R2
0.346
0.357
0.364
+
*
**
t statistics in parentheses (determined with robust standard errors); p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. Case
Controls include the Section 11, Section 14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor
Term., Insider Trading Claim, ln(Settlement Amount), ln(Market Capitalization), Turnover, Minimum
Return, High Tech, and FDA variables. Circuit Effects include indicator variables for the Second, Third,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits. Year Effects are for the year the suit was resolved.
Constant
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Table 6: Pension Fund Assets and Attorney Fees

State Pension—Above Median Assets

Model 1
‐0.303
(‐1.41)

Model 2

State Pension—Above Median Assets
Contribution

0.085
(0.20)

State Pension—Above Median Assets
No Contribution

‐0.444*
(‐2.57)

State Pension—Below Median Assets

‐0.297**
(‐4.25)

‐0.288**
(‐4.20)

Local Pension—Above Median Assets

‐0.457**
(‐3.58)

‐0.449**
(‐3.45)

Local Pension—Below Median Assets

‐0.077
(‐1.11)

‐0.060
(‐0.90)

Labor Union—Above Median Assets

‐0.107
(‐1.60)

‐0.092
(‐1.41)

Labor Union—Below Median Assets

‐0.036
(‐0.66)

‐0.029
(‐0.55)

Other Institution

‐0.019
(‐0.38)

‐0.010
(‐0.20)

Low Loss

0.055
(1.68)

+

0.057+
(1.74)

‐0.697**
‐0.740**
(‐5.60)
(‐5.71)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
N
217
216
R2
0.368
0.385
t statistics in parentheses (determined with robust standard errors); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Case
Controls include the Section 11, Section 14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor
Term., Insider Trading Claim, ln(Settlement Amount), ln(Market Capitalization), Turnover, Minimum
Return, High Tech, and FDA variables. Circuit Effects include indicator variables for the Second, Third,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits. Year Effects are for the year the suit was resolved.
Constant
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Table 7: State Receptivity to Contributions
Panel A
State
AR
CO
LA
NM
NY
OK
PA
PR
VA

Fraction of Cases with a
Contributing Attorney
0.50
1.00
0.58
1.00
0.00
0.50
1.00
0.00
0.00

Panel B
State Pension—Frequent Conflict

Model 1
0.467**
(3.79)

State Pension—Infrequent Conflict

‐0.341**
(‐4.55)

Model 2

State Pension—Large Total Contribution

0.501**
(4.81)

State Pension—Small Total Contribution

‐0.347**
(‐4.66)

Local Pension

‐0.255**
(‐2.79)

‐0.257**
(‐2.83)

Labor Union

‐0.062
(‐1.31)

‐0.062
(‐1.31)

Other Institution

‐0.016
(‐0.31)

‐0.016
(‐0.31)

Low Loss

0.067
(2.08)

*

0.066*
(2.04)

‐0.689**
‐0.684**
(‐5.78)
(‐5.80)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
N
217
217
2
R
0.383
0.385
t statistics in parentheses (determined with robust standard errors); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Case
Controls include the Section 11, Section 14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor
Constant
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Term., Insider Trading Claim, ln(Settlement Amount), ln(Market Capitalization), Turnover, Minimum
Return, High Tech, and FDA variables. Circuit Effects include indicator variables for the Second, Third,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits. Year Effects are for the year the suit was resolved.
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Table 8: Pension Counsel
Panel A: Incidence of Pension Counsel Relationship Among Local Pension Funds
Pension Counsel

Number of Cases
21

Percentage
44.68%

26

55.32%

No Pension Counsel

Panel B
State Pension

Model 1
‐0.297**
(‐3.43)

Pension Counsel

‐0.327**
(‐3.04)

No Pension Counsel

‐0.120
(‐0.94)

Labor Union

‐0.0763
(‐1.56)

Other Institution

‐0.0204
(‐0.39)

Low Loss

0.0696
(2.15)

*

‐0.745**
(‐5.49)
Case Controls
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Year Effects
Yes
N
217
R2
0.352
t statistics in parentheses (determined with robust standard errors); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Case
Controls include the Section 11, Section 14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor
Term., Insider Trading Claim, ln(Settlement Amount), ln(Market Capitalization), Turnover, Minimum
Return, High Tech, and FDA variables. Circuit Effects include indicator variables for the Second, Third,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits. Year Effects are for the year the suit was resolved.
Constant
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Table 9: Nuisance Outcome
State Pension

State Pension—Contribution

Model 1
‐0.555
(‐1.06)

Model 2

Model 3

0.0147
(0.03)

0.0185
(0.04)

0.00706
(0.01)

State Pension—Contribution ≥ Median

‐1.003
(‐1.23)

State Pension—Contribution < Median

‐0.264
(‐0.41)

‐0.276
(‐0.43)

State Pension—No Contribution

‐1.735
(‐1.21)

Local Pension

‐0.595
(‐0.58)

Labor Union

‐0.832
(‐2.50)

*

‐0.828*
(‐2.48)

‐0.835*
(‐2.51)

Other Institution

‐0.0363
(‐0.09)

‐0.0156
(‐0.04)

‐0.0224
(‐0.06)

Low Loss

0.412+
(1.71)

0.416+
(1.72)

0.416+
(1.72)

Constant

‐0.0141
‐0.396
‐0.497
(‐0.01)
(‐0.32)
(‐0.40)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Circuit Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
458
454
454
R2
0.166
0.164
0.165
z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Case Controls include the Section 11, Section
14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor Term., Insider Trading Claim, ln(Settlement
Amount), ln(Market Capitalization), Turnover, Minimum Return, High Tech, and FDA variables. Circuit
Effects include indicator variables for the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits. Year Effects
are for the year the suit was resolved.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Key Independent Variables
Variable
Public Pension

Description
The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of a public
pension fund.

State Pension—Contribution

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
funds with officials who received political contributions from the
lead attorneys.

State Pension—Contribution Above The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state
Median
pensions with a contribution from the lead plaintiffs at the median
or above for all contributions in our sample.
State Pension—Contribution Below The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state public
Median
pensions with a contribution from the lead plaintiffs below the
median for all contributions in our sample.
State Pension—No Contribution

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
funds with officials who did not receive political contributions from
the lead attorneys.

State Pension—Above Median Assets The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
funds with total fund assets at the median or above for state public
pensions in our sample.
State Pension—Below Median Assets The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
funds with total fund assets below the median for state public
pensions in our sample.
State Pension—Frequent Conflict

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
funds with a frequent conflict. Frequent conflict is defined to occur
when a state pension fund is associated with a lead attorney who
made a contribution to fund officials in more than 75% of the cases
in our sample where the public pension fund acts as lead plaintiff.

State Pension—Infrequent Conflict

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of state pension
funds without a frequent conflict. Frequent conflict is defined to
occur when a state pension fund is associated with a lead attorney
who made a contribution to fund officials in more than 75% of the
cases in our sample in which the state pension fund acts as lead
plaintiff.

Local Pension

The fraction of lead plaintiff in a case that consists of local
government pension funds.

Pension Counsel

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of a local
pension funds with a relationship with either the Klausner or
Vanoverbeeke law firms.
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No Pension Counsel

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that consists of a public
pension without a relationship with either the Klausner or
Vanoverbeeke law firms.

Labor Union

The fraction of the lead plaintiffs that consists of a labor union.

Other Institution

The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a case that are institutions but not
public pensions or labor unions.

Low Loss

Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the lead plaintiffs for the
case are at the median or lower for all the lead plaintiffs in our
sample or 0 otherwise.

Other Independent Variables
Case Control Variables
Section 11

Description
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class
action alleged a Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 violation
and 0 otherwise.

Section 14

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class
action alleged a Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
violation and 0 otherwise.

Govt. Investigation

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated the presence
of a SEC or other governmental investigation or enforcement action
relating to the fraud at issue and 0 otherwise.

Restatement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the
company announced a restatement covering at least part of the
class period and 0 otherwise.

Officer Term.

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that a top
officer of the defendant company resigned or was terminated
during the class period and 0 otherwise.

Auditor Term.

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the
auditor resigned or was terminated during the class period and 0
otherwise.

Insider Trading

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged insider trading
and 0 otherwise.

Market Capitalization

Market value of a company’s common equity (in $ millions) at the
end of the fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period.

Settlement Amount

The settlement amount for the class action.

High Tech

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in SIC codes 3570‐3577 or
7370‐7379 and 0 otherwise.

FDA

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the last amended complaint for a
particular class action is based on U.S. Food and Drug
Administration‐related disclosures and 0 otherwise.
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